The problem of evil has long been regarded as a central challenge in philosophy of religion and theology, particularly in accounting for the coexistence of divine attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, and justice with the presence of suffering in the world. Using a descriptive–analytical and comparative method, this article examines the approaches of two influential thinkers from different theological traditions: St. Augustine in Christian theology and Allameh Hilli in Imami theology.

The study shows that both thinkers share an ontological commitment to understanding evil as a privative and non-substantial reality, thereby denying it independent existence. However, their explanations diverge significantly with respect to the origin of evil and its relation to divine justice. Augustine attributes evil primarily to the misuse of human free will and explains natural evils in light of original sin, thereby safeguarding God’s absolute goodness. In contrast, Allameh Hilli allows for the possibility that certain forms of suffering may be attributed to divine action and addresses this challenge through the theological principles of compensation (aʿwāḍ) and redress (intiṣāf).

By comparing the ontological and theological foundations of these two accounts, the article contributes to filling an existing gap in comparative studies and clarifies the distinctive features of each tradition’s response to the problem of evil.